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Abstract
As technology advances, personal privacy is constantly being eroded for the sake
of convenience. This trend is evident in the consumer grade smart home and IoT
devices industry, which has enabled access to potentially compromising information
about users and their homes. Current security solutions ignore convenience by re-
quiring the purchase of additional hardware, implementing confusing, out of scope
updates for a non-technical user, or quarantining a device, rendering it useless. This
paper proposes a solution that simultaneously maintains convenience and privacy,
tailored for the Internet of Things. We propose a novel graceful degradation tech-
nique which targets individual device functionalities for acceptance or denial at the
network level. When combined with current anomaly detection and fingerprinting
methods, graceful degradation provides a personalized IoT security solution for the
modern user.
We identified three main areas in our approach: fingerprinting devices to un-
derstand the composition of a users’ network, anomaly detection to detect attacks
on devices and network intrusions, and degradation to allow only user specified
functions to remain active after an anomaly. First, we layer existing fingerprinting
technologies to create a straight-forward device identification process. Then, we
introduce an intrusion detection system through expanding the work of Kitsune,
a lightweight machine learning intrusion detection system, to monitor the devices
for abnormal or malicious behavior. We utilize previous research that highlights
identifying network features for discovering device functionalities for an attack and
leverage it as a defense mechanism. Next, we create a user-friendly traffic labeling
platform to allow home users to label the extracted network features of any IoT de-
vice function within three minutes. We demonstrate that our random forest classifier
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is able to detect and degrade user-trained functionalities with an average accuracy
rate of 94%. The user is provided with information regarding potential privacy risks
if a specific function is compromised, and given the option to degrade or allow it in
lieu of an anomaly. Finally, we consolidate fingerprinting, anomaly detection, user
training and degradation into an intuitive, straightforward User Interface, the GDI
Security Suite.
Our suite enables a user to monitor all devices on their network and train normal
device and network behaviors. Upon detecting an anomaly, we will follow the spec-
ified risk tolerance as to which functions the user wishes to block, and consequently
drop traffic related to that functionality as well as other foreign activity, while still
allowing other desired functions to remain actionable. Lastly, we notify the user of
such events, making them aware of their current state of security, and provide the




As technology becomes more ubiquitous, and people are in search of convenience
aids, the Internet of Things (IoT) industry continues to automate more aspects of
everyday life. IoT devices are electronic devices that can be remotely controlled,
monitored, or that perform remote commands. IoT devices span from consumer
grade devices controlling home appliances, to financial applications, energy and
water sensors, health care devices, wearable technology and transportation [35].
With 26.6 billion IoT devices connected in 2019 and an estimated 30.7 billion to
be connected in 2020 [52], IoT is one of the largest growing sectors of technology.
Each of these devices is vulnerable to attack or exploit, which could result in an
invasion of privacy, loss of data, or even physical harm. In 2020 it is predicted that
more than 25% of cyber attacks will involve IoT devices [14]. Ironically, 72% of
consumers would own IoT devices to feel safe [7], yet 48% of them were unaware
that these devices can be used to conduct a cyber attack [12]. Consumers lack an
understanding of what data these devices hold, how devices use their data, and what
could happen if their data is exploited by attackers.
Companies who do not specialize in electronics do not take the necessary pre-
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cautions when adding connectivity to their products. They outsource the “smart”
development to IT experts without understanding if a selected third party is specif-
ically an IoT expert. When security and privacy issues arise in these cases, the
manufacturer is of no help to the user, since they lack knowledge of how their prod-
uct was developed [13].
Common security steps in consumer-based devices have been composed of fin-
gerprinting devices, anomaly detection, and mitigation. Currently, mitigation only
consists of quarantining the device off of the network, or asking the home user to
implement confusing firmware updates [36]. Ultimately, most security solutions sim-
ply notify the user that there is something wrong with a device, without explaining
its implications, or suggesting a clear resolution.
Aside from technical solutions, government legislation has attempted to solve
the lack of coherence among the IoT community when it comes to security stan-
dards. Most recently introduced, is the IoT Cybersecurity Improvement Act of 2019
which mainly requires National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to
issue recommendations, and enforces government and vendors to follow those rec-
ommendations, as well as disseminate discovered vulnerabilities sooner and more
widespread. However, there will be an inherent gap in time between the release
of new devices, and when NIST has completed ample penetration testing to make
recommendations, or discover new vulnerabilities to warn companies about. This
legislation only calls for guidelines, and it will remain up to the vendor to adopt
best practices.
A large problem that stems from the sheer size of the IoT industry is the lack
of comprehensive, real world test traffic for researchers to access and analyze. Most
devices and security solutions are tested, or trained on a small sample of data
in an isolated environment, for a miniscule number of devices. In a survey by
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Boutaba et al. the authors “observed that numerous works relied on synthetic data,
particularly in network security. Synthetic datasets are usually simplistic and do
not truly reflect the complexity of real-world settings” [10]. Since there is a lack of
common knowledge regarding the features and normal behavior of the majority of
IoT devices, it is hard to develop a solution that is scalable to all devices.
Despite recent advances in technology and policies regarding IoT security, we
have identified lack of user education and lack of mitigation strategies as consistent
flaws in modern IoT security approaches.
1.1 Contributions
We offer a solution to the problems presented by developing a holistic security
suite that a) identifies devices on Wi-Fi networks, b) monitors network traffic for
anomalous behavior, and c) gracefully degrades device functionalities. We develop a
scalable platform that labels traffic associated with particular device functionalities
by leveraging machine learning. From these labels, we train classifiers to gracefully
degrade user specified functionalities in real-time with minimal user input. Further,
we present risk profiles associated with categorical bins of device functionalities to
educate end users.
Education:
As previously mentioned, nearly 50% of consumers are unaware that the devices
they use everyday in their homes can be turned against them by cyber criminals.
Our security platform informs the home user about their potential vulnerabilities
and perceived risk posture. To accomplish this we show the user what devices
are on their network at any time, what functionalities and features these devices
possess, how different functionalities could be used maliciously or intrude on the
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user’s privacy, and when and which device is under attack. This information will be
portrayed through our Graphical User Interface (GUI) using best Human Computer
Interaction (HCI) practices.
By providing this information, we are arming users with the tools they need to
consider what is an acceptable level of risk for their security and privacy and how
introducing IoT devices will affect their risk posture. Ultimately, a more alert and
aware community will make for a safer and more secure one.
Degradation:
Our main innovation is a mitigation technique customized by the user, to allow
for graceful degradation. Graceful degradation is the practice of maintaining core
functionality, while isolating or disrupting nonessential functions to avoid complete
failure, or in our case, further privacy breaches. Our degradation strategy will also
block anomalous traffic that may be new malicious activity. For example, a Wi-Fi
camera sending email is not a feature that a user would train or expect to occur,
resulting in it being identified as anomalous traffic and dropped in degradation.
Devices have a wide array of applications and in some cases, they may not pose
as a security threat to the home user. For example, a user installs a security camera
placed outside the house to look for intruders. The owner would prefer to continue to
record video and audio, yet still be notified of the devices compromise and prescribed
possible fixes. However, if a camera is used to monitor a child, owners may prefer
to immediately stop video and audio recording if the device is compromised. This
approach allows a user to own their privacy and security while maintaining the
convenience that persuaded them to purchase the device in the first place. Giving
consumers the peace of mind that their security and privacy will be safeguarded,
while still being able to use their devices to their full potentials, will begin to build
a reputation of trust in IoT devices. We believe graceful degradation can provide
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an enormous shift in the IoT community.
Interactive Supervised Machine Learning for Traffic Analysis:
With the ever growing number of IoT devices, no current lab-trained model will be
scalable enough to continue to work for all new devices. We propose an extensible
interactive machine learning model, which prompts a user to easily train and label
exact functionalities of any IoT Wi-Fi device. This technology has not been applied
to device functionality traffic classification before. With this method, any device can
be trained and its individual functions can be isolated for network traffic analysis,
or in our case, degradation. The user’s role is to label what type of functionality,
such as streaming, audio or video, or simple on/off commands is associated with
the traffic, as well as denote exact time frames when that functionality is occurring
within a one hundred and eighty second training interval. This labeled functionality






Smart homes are comprised of a multitude of devices working alongside each other
in a collaborative mesh of devices, all of which is facilitated by protocols. Proto-
cols tie all devices on a network together, facilitating the flow of information, and
providing ways for devices to communicate with one another, the internet, and the
user. In order to perform fingerprinting, anomaly detection and degradation, un-
derstanding how these devices communicate is important. IoT devices have a large
array of functions, sensors, data streams and varying ways to communicate with
other devices. Due to this wide range of data transfer rates and power sources for
IoT devices, several data-link protocols have been created to best facilitate commu-
nication to meet device requirements. The most widespread of these protocols are
Wi-Fi, Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) and Zigbee.
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2.2 Current Device Fingerprinting Techniques
Device fingerprinting techniques are used to determine the types of devices present
on a network. IoT fingerprinting is of particular interest in the cybersecurity field
because adversaries routinely exploit Internet-connected devices while considering
their type. Similarly, different types of devices have varying sets of behavioral ca-
pabilities and risk profiles. For instance, a compromised, internet-enabled camera
would likely intrude on user’s privacy more so than a compromised, Internet-enabled
smart plug would. It is easier to gain information about a place and its inhabitants
through a camera live feed rather than knowing if an outlet was drawing power or
not. Device fingerprinting techniques are used to determine the types of devices
present on a network. Current research titles such as AuDI, ProfilIoT, and IFRAT,
use a handful of specific network traffic features to ascertain a device’s manufacturer,
operating system, or categorical classification of capability. Some open source APIs
(application programming interfaces), such as Fingerbank [18], passively query par-
ticular network traffic signatures across databases of historical device identifications.
Here, we discuss several existing approaches to fingerprinting that operate with-
out reference to historical databases of known network traffic signatures. AuDI is a
system for quickly and effectively identifying the types of devices on IoT networks by
analyzing network communications [32]. AuDI models the periodic communication
traffic of IoT devices using an unsupervised learning method to perform identifi-
cation [32]. ProfilIoT, a machine learning approach for IoT device identification
based on network traffic analysis uses HyperText Transfer Protocol (HTTP) packet
properties to differentiate between IoT device traffic and non-IoT device traffic [38].
ProfilIoT then enriches source and destination IP addresses and ports with publicly
available data from Alexa Rank and GeoIP to categorize device type [38]. IFRAT,
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an IoT field recognition algorithm based on time-series data, observes sampling
rates of various network features, performs clustering with the self-organizing map
machine learning algorithm, then determines IoT field and specific device type [25].
There are observed disadvantages to machine-learning-based fingerprinting ap-
proaches such as AuDI, ProfilIoT, and IFRAT. First, such techniques require time
for training. With no historical signature data to rely on, machine-learning-based
techniques must extract, organize, and analyze network features as observed in real
time. AuDI, for instance, will rarely perform device identification in less than thirty
minutes [32]. Second, such techniques require that an adversary does not disrupt
the learning stages. Introduction of spoofed network data during learning stages
could easily disrupt a machine-learning-based fingerprinting technique and severely
limit an overall confidence level.
Fingerbank [18] is an existing repository for data that can be used to fingerprint
Internet-enabled devices. Fingerbank [18] takes a Media Access Control (MAC) ad-
dress and Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) fingerprint as parameters
in attempting to identify device type. A device exposes its MAC address, a unique
identifier for its network interface, when it connects to a network; individual manu-
facturers use particular ranges of MAC addresses for their products. Similarly, when
requesting an Internet Protocol (IP) address assignment with DHCP, a device asks
for certain DHCP options such as Domain Name Server (DNS) server, or default
gateway,and the sequential ordering of these option requests can be indicative of
device type. Fingerbank [18] uses patterns in MAC addresses and DHCP option
requests to make a best guess at specific device type and manufacturer. Finberbank
does not directly interact with the device it is attempting to fingerprint, rather it
relies on a user interacting with a device to supply a MAC address and DHCP finger-
print. When Fingerbank [18] receives these values, it queries them across historical
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records in order to ascertain device type in a quickly evolving IoT landscape.
Nmap [30], or the Network Mapper, attempts remote operating system detection
using Transmission Control Protocol (TCP)/IP and User Datagram Protocol (UDP)
stack fingerprinting. Nmap [30] sends a series of TCP and UDP packets to the remote
host and examines the data that is returned [30]. After performing a number of
tests, for example, TCP Initial Sequence Number (ISN) sampling, TCP options
support and ordering, IP ID sampling, and initial window size checking, Nmap [30]
compares results to a database of more than two-thousand known operating system
fingerprints [30]. Each fingerprint includes a textual description of the operating
system and a classification that provides vendor name and device type [30]. Nmap
[30] differs from Fingerbank [18] in that it directly interacts with a device that it
is attempting to fingerprint.
Nmap [30] directly interacts with devices through port scanning, which gener-
ates large quantities of traffic and can slow or disable weaker devices on less robust
networks. Further, target devices can be configured to disable port scanning and
limit the accuracy of Nmap [30] operating system detection. Lastly, Nmap [30] oper-
ating system detection requires sudo privileges on the host device. With this, Nmap
[30] differs from machine-learning-based techniques, such as AuDI, ProfilIoT, and
IFRAT, and signature-repository-based techniques, such as Fingerbank [18], in the
way that it gathers information about a device. The former approaches can per-
form passively on a network, while Nmap [30] requires active engagement with target
hosts.
p0f [53], a passive fingerprinting tool distributed in some versions of Kali Linux,
offers a passive alternative to Nmap [30]. p0f [53] utilizes an array of purely pas-
sive traffic fingerprinting mechanisms to identify the players behind any incidental
TCP/IP communications without interfering in any way [53]. Of note, p0f [53] is
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highly scalable and offers extremely fast identification of the operating system and
software on both endpoints of a vanilla TCP connection, especially in settings where
Nmap [30] probes are blocked, too slow, unreliable, or would simply set off alarms
[53].
2.3 Current Anomaly Detection
Anomaly detection refers to the capability of identifying rare events that differ from
the expected or observed status quo and subsequently raise suspicion. In the cy-
bersecurity space, anomaly detection is a common technique utilized by intrusion
detection systems (IDS). Recently, machine learning and Artificial Intelligence (AI)
techniques have made anomaly detection much more sophisticated and reliable when
properly trained and deployed. The majority of anomaly detection techniques in
IDSs operate on network traffic, examining different statistics and extracting meta-
data from network packets. IoT, however, broadens the scope of anomaly detection.
It can still be applied in the traditional sense to network traffic, but it can also be
applied on user actions as inferred through IoT device states.
Within network based anomaly detection, there are several strategies of varying
complexity and effectiveness. Approaches that aim for extremely low overhead use
simplistic algorithms that are not adequate to address the rapidly developing threat
landscape they face [51, 49]. Signature based approaches [44, 15, 42, 39] rely on
having advance knowledge or a database of known attacks that is constantly kept up
to date. Attacks may be device specific, and with the constant influx of new devices,
these models must evolve. Signature-based models fail at detecting zero-day attacks
as those vectors are not yet known. As attackers deploy new, more sophisticated
attacks, these systems have no mechanism to detect the initial infections.
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IDSs can either be network-based or host-based. In the case of IoT, however,
host-based IDSs present several issues. First, deploying a host-based IDS requires
access to device software and the ability to inject third party code into these devices,
which presents a significant vulnerability. [46, 45]. This change would require more
development work on behalf of nearly all device manufacturers and the creation of
an industry standard to which they would need to comply with for this approach
to be successful. Given the sheer size of the IoT market and its competitive nature,
this would be a monumental feat and is unlikely to happen. Second, the multitude
of IoT devices presents a serious scalability issue. Every device added to the network
would have to be flashed with the IDS software [11]. A main benefit of IoT comes
in the ease of deployment and ubiquity. To maintain usability, approaches that are
less intrusive would be preferred.
Some approaches leverage blockchain technology in attempts to become more
resilient to adversarial attacks during the training phase in which attackers can
inject traffic to have the IDS learn malicious traffic as benign traffic. This requires
additional blockchains per IoT model/firmware [23]. The publishing of additional
chains limits the scalability of this approach, especially in the consumer space where
several models, manufactures, and devices interact.
Another approach is Artificial Neural Networks (ANNs). One class of ANNs is a
recurrent neural network (RNN). The main advantage of RNNs over ANNs in terms
of anomaly detection is the ability to have stored states to examine temporal data
more deeply. A Gated Recurrent Unit (GRU) is a less computationally expensive
flavor of an RNN, requiring less training data. Nguyen et al. [38] leverage GRUs in
a self-learning, distributed IDS for IoT networks. While this system achieves a high
level of success, recent research has suggested improvements.
One issue plaguing modern IoT security and IDS is the low overhead available
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in the system contrasted with the high performance demands of sophisticated ANN
IDS methods. To address the gap between performance demands and available com-
putaional power, Kitsune [34] uses an ensemble of autoencoders. Autoencoders are
ANNs that are able to learn efficient data encodings by reconstructing their inputs,
essentially learning the identity function of the original data. In order to maintain
low overhead costs, the depth of the ANN is limited to three layers. Deep, or layered,
ANNs can learn much more complex concepts than shallower networks but become
computationally expensive to train and execute. Furthermore, autoencoders can
be trained in an unsupervised manner, meaning that labeled training data is not
required. Thus, the costly process of labeling a data set, which can be massive when
examining network traces, can be avoided.
Kitsune provides a relatively lightweight ANN anomaly detection approach through
an ensemble of autoencoders. The low cost of autoencoders, accompanied by benefits
such as online, unsupervised learning, differentiates this solution. The open source
data and code base for Kitsune streamlines the deployment and customization of the
system for nearly any configuration. Implementing Kitsune and taking advantage
of their open source code-base and data sets will satisfy the IDS requirements for
our IoT security platform.
2.4 Current Machine Learning Techniques for Net-
work Traffic Classification
Machine learning is a growing area of Computer Science with seemingly endless
applications. Relative to the context of our research, machine learning provides the
capability of network traffic classification. Network traffic is made up of packets,
each containing several features related to their origin, destination, and content.
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In analyzing numerous packets, there is no apparent correlation between a devices
functionality and its network packet. Machine learning allows for features to be
isolated, weighted based on uniqueness, and compared against each other, to form
patterns and “clusters” of similar traffic. Machine learning algorithms can vary in
two main ways. The first is how data is fed into a model to train the classifier.
There are three different methods of labeling the data to build a foundation off
which to match new unseen traffic to a particular cluster. The second is, which
features of the network packets should be extracted in order to form the desired
clusters. We explore the current research field in relation to these two areas in order
to understand which data labeling and feature extraction approaches best fit our
need for device function clustering.
The three main machine learning training paradigms that can be utilized for
classification are supervised, unsupervised, and semi-supervised. Supervised learn-
ing is a paradigm where an input set of data is completely labeled with the correct
classification or value. Supervised learning is useful for problems concerning classi-
fication and regression. Due its requirement of complete correctness of input data,
supervised learning is highly accurate, but the overhead necessary to label all of
the data is often large and usually requires an expert to label the data accurately.
Unsupervised learning absorbs all unlabeled data and learns to infer structures from
the baseline training data. Unsupervised learning also is applicable for clustering
and association, being able to differentiate whether a data point closely follows a
group of data previously ingested. Unsupervised models have less initial overhead
than supervised, due to the lack of necessity of labeling all of the input. However un-
supervised models are only as good as the quality of input data that is used to train
them. To combine the strengths and weaknesses of both, semi-supervised learning
is an approach that labels small amounts of data to train algorithms to accurately
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and precisely extrapolate associations and structures in unlabeled data. Numerous
methods across all three paradigms have been tested to address the problem of net-
work traffic classification [10]. However, these experiments seek to classify protocols
and types of network traffic rather than classify which traffic corresponds to specific
device functionality.
Specific to network traffic classification, the four main areas for feature extraction
in past research include port number, packet payload, host behavior or flow features.
Port number was an effective early traffic classifier as different protocols often were
restricted to certain port number. However, relying solely on port numbers has
become ineffective due to the use of dynamic port negotiation. Meanwhile, adding
port number alongside other features has shown to boost classification scores [10].
Next, the payload of network packets contains application signatures which are
indicative of the purpose of the traffic. With modern security concerns, however, a
majority of these payloads are encrypted and unavailable for inspection. For those
that are available, searching the payload incurs a high overhead, and the number of
unique signatures needed for identification may grow rapidly, rendering this method
difficult to scale and maintain. Host-based classification relies on a monitoring
system being placed in a network to examine criteria, such as the number of hosts
on the network, to predict the classes of interest. It avoids using direct ports or
payloads and instead monitors how a network is interacting with a group of hosts,
such as mail servers, or peer to peer connections. By analyzing how many hosts
on the network are involved with the communication, how many ports are active
and how often different hosts communicate, it is possible to derive types of traffic
such as mail services and video downloads. The final feature space is known as
flow-based. A network flow is a selected sequence of consecutive packets during a
connection. Within this sequence, countless features can be quickly isolated from
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packets in transit. Example features include direction of flow, source and destination
IP addresses and ports, inter-arrival time, average packet length, and number of
packets per flow. Flow-based classification “has the potential to overcome numerous
limitations of other techniques, such as unregistered port numbers, encrypted packet
payload, routing asymmetries, high storage and computational overhead. However,
it remains to be evaluated if flow feature-based classifiers can achieve the accuracy
of payload-based classifiers” [10]. In this work, we took a combined approach of
testing several feature spaces in order to rapidly identify device functionality without
disrupting normal operation speed or performance.
2.5 Interactive Machine Learning for Network Clas-
sification
Interactive Machine Learning (IML) was first introduced in 2003 as a way to “allow
users to train, classify, view, and correct classifications” [17]. This work focused on
having a user analyze images and create classifications based on the images alone.
Then a classifier would be created from the selected images and display feedback.
The user could either refine the classifier by adding more manual classification or
export the classifier. This demanded that the user knew exactly what the classifier
was supposed to output. IML had the benefits of offloading extensive training time
from technical experts, as well as reducing computation time of model training,
as models could be trained by millions of non-technical users simply by clicking
images or typing words. This methodology has been expanded upon and used in
practice across different areas of study. It is most famously known from Google’s
Recaptcha, an authentication method that prompts users to interpret scrambled
text or images containing certain items. Through the interpretation as to whether
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a picture contains an object like a bus, the millions of data points that have been
entered have helped advance systems such as driver-less cars. Classifying static
images and text has expanded to streaming data within the past few years.
In 2006, active learning was introduced for network protocol analysis
[5]. This patented model extracts features of the traffic and generates examples of it,
then re-trains its learning model to better label traffic in the future, but once again
relies on the user’s accuracy in correct labeling. The combination of IML applied
to streaming data and IoT devices is on the cutting edge of research. In 2019 the
technology was used for activity recognition (standing, walking sitting or lying down,
as well as room occupation) of a user based on IoT device streams [47]. In this case,
a prompt for a user to label activity is time sensitive, as a user may forget what past
actions they were doing at a given time. This study investigated active learning by
asking a user to label streams for one activity from several different devices at once.
Not all of these device streams may be directly related to the activity of the user.
Our approach directly labels specific and individual functions of a single device, at
the time the user chooses, allowing them to know exactly which function they are
entering.
Our approach leverages past methods of allowing a user to label data, in order
to train a model which will then handle all unlabeled data. We apply this to device
functionality traffic, where other dynamic noise will be present. Contrary to the
previously discussed methods, our learning model does not rely on the end-user
having knowledge of the correct output of the classifier. Rather the user labels
provides a friendly name to the traffic of a functionality. This label allows the user
to understand which function they are choosing to degrade or allow.
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2.6 Current Degradation Attempts
When a system is compromised through a cyber-attack, we would like critical in-
frastructure and functionality to remain operable. The majority of people introduce
IoT devices into their smart homes for the purpose of convenience and usability,
automating everyday tasks and generally making life easier. Therefore, consumers
would prefer to maintain as much functionality as possible when an IDS detects
an attack. Incorporating graceful degradation will allow our network to maintain
partial functionality while compromised or under attack.
Removing all device functionality nullifies the benefits of adding these devices
to the home. For example, Minim is a company providing an AI based IoT security
approach to monitor devices and traffic on your network. When a device is infected
or an attack detected, Minim’s response is to quarantine the source device from
the network [33]. This renders the device useless until the attack is resolved. No
functionality of that device may be accessed.
Another comprehensive home security solution, the BitDefender Box, acts as a
network gateway and IDS. How Bitdefender handles security breaches, however, is
not clear. The company simply states that the box “shuts down traffic” [36]. This
language seems to imply quarantining devices or creating an IP blacklist. Nowhere
in their platform does the notion of degradation get mentioned.
Graceful degradation can be approached at multiple levels of complexity. The
simplest method would be to access publicly-available application programming in-
terfaces (APIs) or settings menus programmatically [26, 4]. If this functionality can
be accessed through menus and APIs it is reasonable to assume that an adversary
could do the same, effectively overturning the degraded functionality.
A more complex and robust approach to IoT degradation identifies and targets
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traffic associated with specific device functionality. Accar et al. [3] present a novel
attack that utilized machine learning techniques to profile traffic of smart home
device communications even when the traffic was encrypted. The paper proposes a
passive adversary that is listening to network traffic as part of a multi-layer privacy
attack. By identifying traffic from devices such as light bulbs and locks, an adversary
can determine when the user is home and even what room they could be in. Although
this is framed as an attack, the techniques proposed can be leveraged as a defense
mechanism. By identifying and dropping traffic associated with device functionality,
graceful degradation in IoT-enabled smart homes can be achieved.
The above is an example of a privacy attack [3], but attackers are also interested
in harnessing the power of combining IoT devices into botnets [15]. Such an attack





In this chapter, we discuss our fingerprinting, intrusion detection, graceful degrada-
tion, and integration capabilities. Particularly, we present a novel, scalable approach
for the graceful degradation of IoT device functionalities.
Approach 1: In order to enable graceful degradation, our team proposed a
system consisting of of three main modules with a manager handling integration
communication between modules. Our IDS is anomaly detection-based, leveraging
machine learning to differentiate benign and malicious network traffic. Once an
anomaly is triggered it sends a message to the manager with the MAC addresses
that raised the flag. The MAC addresses are then sent to the fingerprinting module.
This module is responsible for identifying and tracking all of the IoT devices present
on the network. Given a MAC address, the fingerprinting module will be able
to identify what device triggered the anomaly. Fingerprinting devices also allows
us to understand what capabilities are present in the smart home and translate
these capabilities to security and privacy vulnerabilities. These attack vectors are
presented to the user, who can decide what functionality to degrade in order to
custom tailor a risk profile that is acceptable to them. The degradation of features
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Figure 3.1: High level system design and service call relationship layout
will be accomplished through traffic classification across multiple protocols such as
Wi-Fi, Zigbee, and Bluetooth.
3.1 Enabling Sniffing of Alternative Protocols
While the testbed infrastructure makes it trivial to sniff for IoT Wi-Fi traffic asso-
ciated with the mqpinet, the other two protocols of BLE and Zigbee require further
hardware. Sniffing these two protocols is necessary for capturing the traffic that
occurs between these devices and determining which packet attributes match device
functionality.
In order to perform such BLE sniffing, our team chose Ubertooth One Hardware
and Ubertooth linux software, due to its low cost, complete documentation and
portability with pcap files and Wireshark integration. Ubertooth One hardware
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was purchased and the software and was installed following the github instructions
[21]. Once the software was installed, the Ubertooth One device was attached to the
computer and bridged into the virtual environment. Ensuring that the device was
found using ubertooth-util -V. Once the device was properly recognized, we followed
the guide [22] for flashing the firmware onto the device. Our device was now capable
of sniffing BLE traffic.
In order to sniff Zigbee traffic, we chose the ApiMote v4 beta developed by
Riverloop security, as it comes pre-flashed with Killerbee firmware, however an ex-
tra antenna was gathered from a router to improve range and performance of the
APiMote. We also installed Killerbee, following the instructions [50]. Once Killer-
bee was installed, and hardware was detected, we were able to sniff Zigbee traffic.
3.2 Change in Approach
We originally considered Bluetooth Low Energy and Zigbee enabled devices to cover
the full scope of common protocols in the IoT space for fingerprinting and degrada-
tion. However through interacting with the devices, we discovered a large portion
of device functionality eventually communicates over Wi-Fi. We decided we would
no longer investigate the Bluetooth and Zigbee protocols in the scope of this project
for the following reasons:
• Nearly all IoT devices have a transport layer of either TCP or UDP and com-
municate over Wi-Fi in some capacity, regardless of use of alternate protocols
[43]
• The majority of Zigbee and BLE devices have hubs that connect to Wi-Fi
and all function traffic is transmitted from a users phone to said hub. In fact
Samsung SmartThings, who is a producer of Zigbee devices, clearly states
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Figure 3.2: Ethernet traffic from Hue Bulb Zigbee device reveals device functionality
“An active Internet connection to the Hub is always required to manually
control your devices and SmartApps via the SmartThings mobile app.” So any
controls sent from your smart-phone to the hub to be relayed to the devices
occurs over Wi-Fi connection. So by sniffing all Wi-Fi traffic, we are able to
identify functionality in Zigbee devices such as Phillips Hue Bulbs.
Next, BLE end devices can only be connected to one master device like a cell-
phone, so the attacker would have to be present to intercept the first Bluetooth
packet in order to connect to it. In this case the home user would be suspicious if
they cannot connect and disconnect it. To exploit BLE or Zigbee directly, the at-
tacker would have to be within 10 to 100 meters of the devices, while 30 m is usually
the cutoff for a reliable connection. Those connection ranges are also recommended
for line of sight with the device [43]. So an attacker would have to be relatively close
to a users’ house and specifically target their devices, rather than find them on the
Internet from a remote location.
Our original approach to investigating the degradation of a few functions of Zig-
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bee and BLE devices involved capturing the traffic, analyzing the flow rate, and
setting a threshold. This approach was modeled after the Peekaboo attack vector
[3]. However we discovered with Wi-Fi devices, we are able to track specific con-
nections with enough constant features that it is possible to create ML classifiers to
degrade functionality without looking at the traffic in static snapshots to compare
to a threshold. Rather, we can train a model to map certain device functional-
ity to a large number of features. Exploring a solution to automate functionality
degradation, rather than statically proving degradation on small features over these
protocols, will be more fruitful in both the engineering and IoT security space.
Moving forward, our contributions of degradation will not be diminished by
focusing only on Wi-Fi connections, and introducing the ability for any home user
to label, train and degrade any functionality of a device as they choose, making it
truly graceful.
3.3 New Approach
The proposed updated system consists of six main modules with a manager handling
integration and communication between tools and the user. An addition to our new
approach was the addition of a novel user-labeled ML model for device functionality.
The testbed, management system and anomaly detection methods remained the
same. The major difference is that only Wi-Fi devices will be fingerprinted, with
the same tools as before.
The user will be able to access the GUI through a web server hosted on the Pi and
discover all Wi-Fi devices on their network. The fingerprinting will display guesses
and allow the user to name the devices IP address a “Friendly Name” based on the
fingerprinting results. They will be able to identify and train new machine learning
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Figure 3.3: Updated high level system design and service call relationship layout
models for degradation based on each feature of the device. As the user is prompted
to test a new function, the network packets are sampled through netfilterqueue, and
unique identifying features are extracted to form a Random Forest Model. The user
will be able to select devices and trained functions of those devices to pinpoint what
functionality they would like to degrade.
When an anomaly is detected, the corresponding Degradation IP table rules to
which functions the user has selected to degrade will be turned on and that traffic
will be blocked.
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Figure 3.4: An overview of the testbed network architecture.
3.4 Configuring a Standalone, Wireless, Test-bed
Network with Raspberry Pi
In order to perform our experiments without sniffing private traffic from the uni-
versity, or degrading other users’ devices, we created our own private test network.
This network will act like any other Wi-Fi Network; however, only our IoT devices
will be connected to it and the only traffic passing through will be the traffic of
interest to us from these devices. This testbed will serve as the base for all four
aspects of the project mentioned above. The team configured a Raspberry Pi as an
access point in a standalone network using NAT (Network Address Translation) [19].
The inbuilt wireless features of the Raspberry Pi 3 can be used to host a standalone
network with integrated DHCP software.
First, the team used Ethernet to connect the Pi to the existing network present at
the apartment where testing was being conducted. With this, the Pi was connected
to the existing network using eth0 as opposed to wlan0. Second, the team installed
dnsmasq and hostapd software and assigned the static IP address 192.168.4.1 to
the Pi. Third, the team configured dnsmasq such that the Pi would provide IP
addresses between 192.168.4.2 and 192.168.4.20 with a lease time of 24 hours.
Fourth, the team configured hostapd such that the Pi would host a 2.4 GHz wireless
27
network called mqpinet using wlan0. Finally, the team added a masquerade for
outbound traffic on eth0 and saved corresponding rules.
After rebooting the Pi and starting dnsmasq and hostapd services, the team
began connecting IoT devices to the mqpinet wireless network. As devices connected
to the mqpinet network, dnsmasq would assign IP addresses on the existing network
in the range 192.168.4.2 to 192.168.4.20 as previously configured. In this way,
all wireless traffic originating from the IoT devices was 1) received by the mqpinet
on the Pi via wlan0 and 2) forwarded to the existing network via eth0. With this,
the team could swiftly differentiate between traffic from the IoT devices involved
in the experiment and traffic from devices on the existing network not involved in
the experiment. From the Pi, the team sniffed wlan0 to only intercept network
traffic interacting with devices on the mqpinet testbed network. Even still, the
team could sniff eth0 to intercept all network traffic from both mqpinet and the
existing network.
3.5 Device Gathering
The team gathered a range of IoT devices for the project. Some devices offered
simple on or off functionalities, such as smart plugs, while some devices offered
complicated audio or video streaming functionalities, such as the Amazon Blink
Wi-Fi cameras and Amazon Alexa Echo Dot.
• Amazon Alexa Echo Dot
• TP-Link Wi-Fi smart plug
• Raspberry Pi 3
• Amazon Blink Wi-Fi camera
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• Amazon Blink Wi-Fi camera
• Etekcity Wi-Fi smart plug
• Particle Photon
• Google Chromecast
• Philips Hue Bridge
3.6 Fingerprinting Configuration
The selected devices were then connected to the Pi testbed network which was acting
as a router for mqpinet at 192.168.4.1. Devices joined this network just like any
other Wi-Fi network. With active devices on our network, the following necessary
step was to identify the devices on the network through the Raspberry Pi itself.
Fingerprinting devices is an important step in consumer security as it allows the
home user to be aware of what devices are on their network, incase an attacker
introduces a rogue device. Fingerprinting also allows us as the security system to
analyze and store information on network traffic to human readable devices, and to
gain insight into what types of traffic there may be, depending upon which device is
generating that traffic. Fingerprinting is a well studied and explored research area, so
we focused on layering pre existing tools, rather than developing our own stand alone
solution. The team centered device fingerprinting capabilities around functionalities
offered by the Fingerbank [18] API and Nmap [30]. By sniffing wlan0 on the Pi
testbed, the team could filter IoT traffic routed through the Pi. Fingerprinting
capabilities were housed and executed on the Pi itself, eliminating the need for
additional hardware.
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First, the team authored fingerbank_handler.py to extract relevant packet fea-
tures and interact with the Fingerbank [18] API. With Scapy sniffing, the team used
filter udp and (port 67 or port 68) on the interface wlan0 to intercept packets
on mqpinet with a DHCP layer. When a packet with a DHCP layer was intercepted,
the fingerbank_handler.py extracted 1) the DHCPv4 fingerprint and 2) the MAC
address of the device from which the packet originated. To determine a DHCPv4 fin-
gerprint, fingerbank_handler.py examined DHCP options from the DHCP layer
and extracted the value of the param_req_list key. To determine a MAC ad-
dress, fingerbank_handler.py examined the Ether layer and extracted the src
MAC address. Once fingerbank_handler.py had extracted a DHCPv4 fingerprint
and MAC address, it queried the Fingerbank [18] API to obtain a JSON package
denoting Fingerbank’s best guesses at manufacturer, operating system, and type
for the device from which the examined traffic originated. It is important to note
that fingerbank_handler.py only queried the Fingerbank [18] API if an extracted
MAC address had not been seen before. fingerbank_handler.py kept record of
API queries that were previously conducted by uniquely identifying JSON packages
by the MAC addresses of devices whose extracted features were being queried.
Second, the team authored nmap_handler.py to 1) map IP addresses to MAC
addresses for hosts on the mqpinet network and 2) perform Nmap [30] operating
system detection on discovered hosts. To map IP addresses to MAC addresses,
nmap_handler.py executed nmap -sP 192.168.4.0/24 with sudo privileges and
used regular expression matching to sequentially extract and pair IP addresses and
MAC addresses from the command’s output. To perform Nmap [30] operating system
detection on a discovered host with IP host_ip, nmap_handler.py first executed
$ nmap -O -Pn --host-timeout 3m host_ip
with sudo privileges. Second, nmap_handler.py used regular expression match-
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ing to extract a MAC address, manufacturer, device type, and operating system
version and details from the command’s output to forge a custom JSON pack-
age. nmap_handler.py also kept record of OS detection scans that were already
conducted on particular hosts, uniquely identifying JSON packages by the MAC
addresses of each historically targeted host.
Third, the team authored p0f_handler.sh to 1) use tcpdump to collect packets
originating from a specified MAC address and 2) assess captured packets for finger-
print signatures with p0f [53]. To capture packets originating from a specified MAC
address, the team used
$ sudo tcpdump -c [number of packets to be captured] -i
wlan0 -w [.pcap to write to] ether src host [target MAC
address]
.
To assess captured packets for fingerprint signatures, the team used
$ sudo ./p0f -r [.pcap written to] -o [.log to write to]
> /dev/null
.
To review p0f [53] logs for operating system guesses, the team authored a Python
script to run regular expression matching over the log. In some cases, p0f [53] offered
varying operating system guesses, such as several guesses for Linux and several
guesses for Android, based on traffic originating from the supplied MAC address.
The Python script considered the amount of times a guess for a particular operating
system appeared in the p0f [53] log while formulating the final p0f [53] JSON.
Fourth, the team authored fingerprint.sh to incorporate
Fingerbank [18], Nmap [30], and p0f [53] capabilities into a single script. While
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Fingerbank [18] capabilities were to always be sniffing in the background, Nmap
[30] and p0f [53] capabilities were to be run in iteration every n minutes. Further,
JSON synthesization needed to be conducted every n minutes as well, following the
completion of Nmap [30] and p0f [53] scans. fingerprint.sh ensured that all three
capabilities could be run in harmony and that JSON records of device fingerprints
would be updated as frequently as possible. To enable automated start and stop
of the script, the team created a sudo-level service called mqp_finger.service. To
start all fingerprinting capabilities, the team called
sudo systemctl start mqp_finger.service. Similarly, to stop all fingerprinting
capabilities, the team called
sudo systemctl stop mqp_finger.service. This interface allowed seamless in-
teraction between the fingerprinting module and all other modules in the project.
Additionally, a Python script was authored to retrieve the most current fingerprint-
ing data on file for any MAC address.
3.7 Anomaly Detection Configuration
In order to protect and secure the smart home we must have an intrusion detection
system in place. This system constantly monitors network traffic to detect and catch
any abnormal behaviors. The specific framework our team selected was the Kitsune
IDS for network based anomaly detection leveraging machine learning techniques.
At the heart of our anomaly detection IDS, constantly inspecting network traffic,
is Kitsune. Kitsune’s use of an ensemble of autoencoders enables unsupervised
learning to be easily deployed on any network. Unsupervised learning eliminates the
need for labeling large training datasets and enables real time, online learning which
is beneficial in the current rapidly evolving threat landscape. Due to the utilization
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of autoencoders and the restriction on neural network depth, this framework is
relatively light weight for a machine learning based IDS. Using as little resources as
possible for a robust solution is imperative in the IoT space where there the majority
of devices have limited computational power.
There were several small tweaks made to the Kitsune codebase to better suit
our application and testbed infrastructure. For the scope of this project, we are not
concerned with low latency anomaly detection times. Therefore, we implemented a
pseudo-live IDS with Kitsune. This implementation uses tcpdump, with the -W and
-G flags to specify time and rotation, to collect the network traffic flowing through
the Raspberry Pi gateway over a user specified time interval and stores these traces
in pcap files. These pcaps are then read by Kitsune for processing and inspection.
Initially Kitsune was built to take in a single pcap file to learn the features, train
and execute the anomaly detector. After some reverse engineering, it can now
dynamically parse a directory of pcaps, inspecting the pcaps in chronological order.
By adding this functionality we only have to train the feature extractor and
anomaly detector once, and then Kitsune can be run to detect anomalies over the
user specified time interval. All of this functionality was then condensed into a single
python script that can handle training Kitsune, capturing packets, and executing
Kitsune to detect anomalies. A a repository including this script and our modified
version of Kitsune is publicly available in the appendix.
3.8 Anomaly Detection Integration
After Kitsune was properly configured the next step in becoming operational is
determining an anomaly threshold. Picking an appropriate threshold for an IDS is
of paramount importance. The value should result in high confidence that there
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is an anomaly while reducing the number of false positives. A common approach
to determine a threshold is to use a receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve,
which plots the aptitude of any given threshold. In order to generate a ROC curve
we need experimental data of our IDS’s performance against a variety of attacks.
The autoencoders that drive Kitsune are trained to reconstruct their inputs. In
the case of an network based IDS, the encoders will learn to reconstruct network
traffic based on a sample of benign traffic. Once the IDS is finished training, if the
traffic is malicious, not benign, then it will have a high reconstruction error. Kitsune
measures this error with the RMSE, which will be the metric used to trigger an
anomaly.
Tracing high root mean squared error (RMSE) values to their corresponding
packets was added to begin tracing back anomalies to potentially infected devices
or attack vectors. Once the packet was found for the anomalous error score the MAC
address is extracted. Our fingerprinting framework takes this MAC and matches it
with the corresponding device. Integrating anomaly detection and fingerprinting is
the first step in graceful degradation pipeline because we now have a vague under-
standing of how the vulnerability was introduced into the network. This is also gives
us a strong starting point to begin degrading device specific functionality.
Initially we were hoping to compile experimental results of running our IDS
against benign and malicious traffic over the various different attack pcaps provided
in the Kitsune paper. While just beginning to experiment with the provided pcaps,
we noticed inconsistencies in the RMSE values when executing over the same file.
We were able to trace this difference to the preprocess feature built into Kitsune.
When reading a file, Kitsune checks to see if tshark, the command line version of
wireshark [20], is installed on the system. If tshark is present, it will parse the
pcap with the tool and dump the output to a tsv file. The reason for this being
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that tshark is much faster than scapy, which is used when tshark is not present.
Reducing overhead is beneficial, however, pcaps parsed by tshark were returning
different values than those parsed by scapy. Given as scapy was used to generate the
example plots on Kitsune’s github, we assumed that tshark parsing was a feature
added later in development and subsequently went through less testing. Due to the
accelerating time frame of this project we could not spend any time debugging and
fixing the preprocessing feature.
After the preprocessing bug, we continued examining pcaps and found there were
significant differences between the Mirai experiments and other common network
attacks such as SSDP floods, DoS attacks, wiretaps, and fuzzing. We believe this
discrepancy arises from the footnote in the Mirai pcap description that states it was
recorded on a different IoT network. This would explain the drastic difference in
RMSE value ranges for malicious traffic. The discrepancy in the experimental data
sets left us with two options: generate a ROC curve with all the data excluding
Mirai, or generate data on our own network which could include Mirai. Given the
sheer scale and devastation Mirai wreaked, particularly in IoT devices, we decided
to carry out experimental attacks on the IoT infrastructure we had setup.
The first two attacks deployed were network disruption/denial of service (DoS)
attacks. The attacks were launched from a machine running Kali Linux 2019.3,
and the primary tools used were airmon-ng, airodump-ng [2], and mdk3 [27]. The
attacker also has access to a network card that has both a packet monitoring and
injection mode. In this experiment the Alfa AWUS036NEH network card with
Ralink RT3070 chipset was used. Both attacks started with a brief reconnaissance
phase by utilizing monitor mode to discover and identify devices on the network.
Once the target(s) were identified, airodump-ng was launched to watch the target
traffic. The first attack launched was a targeted DoS attack directed at a Wi-Fi
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camera. Using airmon-ng, the attacker sent a flood of deauthentication packets
between the IoT access point and the camera, effectively cutting off communication
to and from the camera. The success of this attack was verified through airodump-
ng logs and the inability of the home user to launch a live stream from the targeted
camera. The second attack was not targeted and aimed to disrupt the entire network.
This time airodump-ng was used to monitor the IoT access point and mdk3 sent a
flood of deauthentication packets pointed at the access point. This attack is much
louder and more noticeable than the targeted attack since it disables communication
between all devices connected to the victim access point. The success of the attack
was verified by trying and failing to reach multiple different devices connected to
the victim access point.
The third attack we carried out was a meddler-in-the-middle (MITM) attack.
These types of attacks can be conducting with many different techniques, but we
choose an address resolution protocol (ARP) spoofing attack. In this attack we
assume that the attacker has gained access to the network. Once in the network, the
attacker begins to spoof ARP packets in attempts to associate their MAC address
with the target IP address, thus intercepting all traffic meant for the target. Our
meddler successfully spoofed ARP messages and intercepted traffic between the IoT
access point and an Amazon Alexa. This attack was detected by Kitsune as two
major anomalies. The first is when the attacker joined the network and the second
is when the attacker began routing traffic through their machine.
The fourth and final attack conducted was infecting a device with the Mirai
botnet malware. Mirai targets poorly secured IoT devices to infect as bots. At its
height this botnet contained hundreds of thousands of infected devices that were
able to launch a record breaking 620 Gigabit per second denial of service (DoS)
attack in 2016 [28]. The source code for the malware has since been made public,
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and we retrieved a copy from Github (https://github.com/jgamblin/Mirai-Source-
Code). To ensure that we could deploy the malware safely in our testbed we disabled
several features of the original malware. First we disabled the ability of Mirai to kill
other communication services such as telnet and ssh on the bots so that we could
reconnect and disinfect the devices. We also removed the ability for the botnet
to propogate itself by deleting the loader. However, we kept the scanner for the
purposes of watching the bot attempt to talk to and infect other devices but not
having the means to without the loader. With our custom build of Mirai, we infected
our IoT testbed. A remote command and control (CNC) server was also deployed
to monitor the bots and send attack instructions. Once infected, we instructed the
infected bots to carry out a DoS attack on a target IP. From examining the traffic
and the output from Kitsune, we saw clear spikes when communication with the
CNC server was initiated and when the attack commands were received and carried
out.
The graphs in Figure 3.5 are a compilation of the RMSE values of all four attack
vectors. Notice the scales on each of the graphs and greatly they differ from each
other. Obviously just comparing these value to determine a threshold would not be
effective. We need a data processing technique to compare Kitsune’s output across
its wide dynamic range.
A number of different techniques were considered to address this problem in-
cluding moving averages and whitening transforms. We discovered that by taking
the slope of the standard deviation we were able to compare these datasets with the
same threshold. Standard deviation is a statistical tool used to measure the amount
of variation in a set of values. Therefore, it acts as bridge to compare the variance
between sets that have varying ranges. To look for sudden changes or spikes in this
variance, which would indicate an anomaly, we take the slope of a set of standard
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Figure 3.5: Kitsune’s RMSE output for all four attack vectors.
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Figure 3.6: The affect of our data processing technique.
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deviations. Experimentation yielded the best results when taking the sample stan-
dard deviation of sets of 20 values and then calculating the slope of every 5 standard
deviation measurement. The results of our data processing technique are shown in
Figure 3.6. Note how all graphs now have the same scale.
During this experimentation we discovered another bug that we had introduced
with an earlier revision to the codebase. When making Kitsune pseudo real-time,
we split the large prerecorded pcap files into smaller files that we later stitched
back together to simulate a real operating environment. We noticed that when
stitching pcaps back together we were losing dynamic range for the RMSE values.
We eventually discovered that splitting the first 50,000 packets that Kitsune uses
to train the feature extractor and learn benign traffic patterns causes this loss in
range. During the training phase Kitsune must receive a single pcap for optimal
performance. A change was made in the driver script and now the first capture
waits until the capture reaches 50,000 packets before segmenting pcaps in smaller
time frames.
The attack data was compiled into the excel file ”ROC.xlsx” which can be found
in our Git repository. The generated ROC curve will be discussed in anomaly
detection results, section 4.2.
3.9 Determining Device Functionality Bins for use
in Risk Identification
The team categorized device functionalities across testbed IoT devices into “bins” so
as to provide simple, generalized risks. Across all possible IoT device functionalities,
the team designated the following categorical bins in decreasing order of riskiness:
a) video streaming, such as live video streaming from a smart camera, b) audio
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streaming, such as live audio streaming from an Amazon Echo, and c) device state
change, such as switching a smart plug or lightbulb on or off [3]. Then, the team
considered scenarios in which devices that offered functionalities in these bins were
compromised; here, the team considered risks associated with each type of device
functionality bin.
First, an allowed video streaming functionality on a compromised device would
allow an adversary to access the onboard camera without restriction. The risks
associated with allowing a video streaming functionality on a compromised device
are apparent: an adversary could covertly monitor live-stream camera feeds at any
time [37]. Footage from indoor smart cameras, perhaps positioned in bedrooms or in
living spaces, could be streamed, or even broadcasted publically, at will. Degrading
a video streaming functionality on a compromised device would prevent this from
occurring.
Second, an allowed audio streaming functionality on a compromised device would
allow an adversary to access the onboard microphone and likely onboard speakers
without restriction. The risks associated with allowing an audio streaming func-
tionality on a compromised device are therein straightforward: an adversary could
covertly listen-in at any time or likely make announcements through speakers [37].
This risk is particularly notable when discussing Amazon Echo Dots; having the
ability to listen and to “speak”, an adversary could literally carry a two-way con-
versation with a homeowner. Degrading an audio streaming functionality on a
compromised device would prevent this from occurring.
Third, an allowed state change functionality on a compromised device would
allow an adversary to not only change device state, but to also make powerful
inferences from an end user’s state change patterns. Prior research indicates that
state changes in devices as simple as smart plugs and smart light bulbs could reveal
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user sleep patterns, home and away patterns, and more [3]. With little additional
work, adversaries could leverage this information to coordinate burglaries and home
invasions. Degrading a state change functionality on a compromised device would
prevent this from occurring.
3.10 Graceful Degradation of IoT Device Func-
tionalities
The team defined ”graceful degradation” as the ability to autonomously and se-
lectively allow or disallow particular IoT device functionalities to a configuration
specified by an end user. The team developed an extensible platform that encour-
aged an end user to introduce many types of functionalities across many types of
devices to a maintained degradation knowledge base. The team’s application al-
lowed an end user to specify which functionalities should be allowed or disallowed
if certain devices had been compromised. First, the team investigated network traf-
fic associated with device functionalities to ascertain a packet feature vector for
use in machine learning integration with the sklearn Python library. Second, the
team developed a functionality labeling workflow, supervised by an end user, that
allowed the introduction of new functionalities for devices on the network. Third,
the team developed a functionality modeling workflow, completely unsupervised by
way of machine learning integration, that yielded high-confidence classifications for
traffic associated or disassociated with device functionalities as introduced initially
by an end user. Lastly, the team developed a packet filtering workflow that inte-
grated device functionality machine learning classifiers with analysis of live traffic
so as to determine if packets were associated or disassociated with particular device
functionalities in real-time.
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Figure 3.7: Blink camera functionality as derived from throughput.
3.11 Investigating Network Traffic Associated with
Device Functionalities
First, the team investigated network traffic associated with device functionalities to
ascertain a packet feature vector for use in machine learning integration. Initially, in
modeling the work presented in Peek-a-boo [3], the team examined traffic volume,
or total data throughput per second, of traffic bound for and/or originating from
particular devices in pursuit of recognizing network traffic associated with particular
functionalities. Line plots of data throughput against time illustrated that packet
size is a useful indicator in mapping traffic to particular device functionalities.
There were many reasons as to why the team could not rely solely on through-
put data in classifying traffic, though. Most importantly, with research into Net-
filterQueue [1], the team learned that packets cannot gracefully be “delayed” at
a router until throughput data over a certain interval could be observed. In other
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Figure 3.8: TP-Link plug functionality as derived from throughput.
words, in order to determine throughput per second, the team would need to “delay”
packets at a router for a period of time as to assess the throughput of the preceding
period of time. Herein, using solely packet size in live-time classification would prove
difficult in development and cumbersome in implementation. In further modeling
the work of Peek-a-boo [3] and Kitsune [34], the team expanded the packet feature
vector to include a) packet size, b) TCP source port, c) TCP destination port, d)
an integer hash of TCP flags, e) UDP source port, and f) UDP destination port.
In investigating network traffic, the team considered the possible existence of
certain device functionalities that supported the concurrent maintenance of multiple
TCP streams. TCP differs from UDP in the sense that it is not loss tolerant. The
team identified a theoretical edge case where multiple, concurrent streams belonging
to device functionalities existed, but where only a subset of those streams was to
be degraded. In this case, TCP would attempt to reorganize and resend packets
that had been lost to degradation, making it difficult to differentiate one concurrent
TCP stream with another. However, with extensive testing, the team concluded that
every IoT device to be tested did not support concurrent TCP streaming. The team
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observed that even the most complicated IoT devices, such as the Amazon Echo
Dot, could only maintain a single TCP stream at once. Further, the team noted
that every IoT device to be tested had a “timeout” feature that ceased attempts to
access functionalities when they were actively being degraded. UDP streams, being
loss tolerant, did not concern the team in this context.
3.12 Labeling Device Functionalities with User
Supervision
Second, the team developed a functionality labeling workflow, supervised by an
end user, that allowed the introduction of new functionalities for devices on the
network. To the team’s research, the concept and implementation of an end-user-
supervised functionality introduction phase is a novel contribution to the field. The
functionality labeling workflow invites an end user to supply a) a device functionality
label, such as camera live stream, Echo Dot listen-in, and b) the MAC address of the
device to which this functionality will be added in the degradation knowledge base.
In turn, this phase maintains a base of various functionalities as associated with
various devices as introduced by an end user. Similarly, the team also developed
an unsupervised workflow to collect “baseline” traffic from devices. An example of
baseline traffic includes device communications when an end user was not interacting
with a device so as to make use of a functionality. In booting, the workflow uses
Scapy [8] to filter packets sourced from the target MAC address. While interacting
with this workflow and adding a new device functionality, an end user is asked to
mark start and end timeline bounds for traffic associated with that functionality. For
instance, in adding a live-stream functionality for a smart camera, an end user would,
in real-time, a) mark a start boundary just before starting to live-stream from that
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camera, and b) mark an end boundary just after ending the live-stream from that
camera. In marking time intervals in which device functionalities were being used,
an end user allows the functionality labeling workflow to then autonomously label
individual, captured packets as either a) associated with or b) disassociated with a
particular device functionality. For each functionality across each device, captured
packets are labeled as functionality-associated or functionality-disassociated, added
to a set of (packet, label) tuples, and saved with Python for future reference in
machine learning phases of the team’s application.
3.13 Modeling Device Functionalities without User
Supervision
Third, the team developed a functionality modeling workflow, completely unsuper-
vised by way of machine learning integration, that yielded high-confidence classifica-
tions for traffic associated or disassociated with device functionalities as introduced
initially by an end user. This workflow was performed autonomously immediately
following a user-supervised stage as described previously. As discussed, each in-
troduced functionality for each device maintained a saved set of (packet, label)
tuples. In modeling the work of Peek-a-boo [3], the team used each picked set,
and the saved sets of baseline traffic and of other existing device functionalities,
to create a random forest classifier for each device functionality. For instance, in
creating a classifier for a new device functionality “A”, the team considered existing
packet captures previously associated with baseline traffic, device functionality “B”,
device functionality “C”, etc. With this approach, the team utilized existing, saved
packet sets to provide “noise” from other device functionalities when modeling a
new functionality so as to improve sample size. The modeling workflow extracted
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a) packet size, b) TCP source port, c) TCP destination port, d) an integer hash
of TCP flags, e) UDP source port, and f) UDP destination port from each saved
packet, labeling each as functionality-associated or functionality-disassociated using
the labels provided by the user-supervised workflow. In turn, for each device func-
tionality, a matrix of as many rows as there were saved packets in the training set
was created with a) packet size, b) TCP source port, c) TCP destination port, d)
an integer hash of TCP flags, e) UDP source port, f) UDP destination port, and
g) functionality associated by indicating whether a particular packet was associated
with a device functionality as column headers. Across all device functionalities, the
team achieved an average model confidence of 94% using the random forest algo-
rithm. Tuples of model objects and model accuracies were created and saved for
each device functionality for reference in live packet filtering.
3.14 Integrating Functionality Models into Live
Packet Filtering
Lastly, the team developed a packet filtering workflow that integrated machine learn-
ing models to identify device functionality so as to determine if packets were associ-
ated or disassociated with particular device functionalities in real-time. The degra-
dation system maintained a directory of saved random forest models as associated
with particular device functionalities. For each device with modeled functionality,
the packet filtering workflow paired a NetfilterQueue queue [1] and iptables rule,
$ sudo iptables -t raw -I PREROUTING -m mac --mac-source
{device MAC address} -j NFQUEUE --queue-num {queue number}
so as to direct traffic sourced from such devices to a uniform Python workflow.
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Figure 3.9: From one stream of traffic, a Netfilterqueue is created for each device
on the network, and all feed into one classifier.
In utilizing the PREROUTING table, the team could drop packets even before they
had been routed, significantly increasing overall performance [31]. Initially, the
team attempted to use a singular NetfilterQueue queue to handle all traffic on the
network. With further investigation, the team made the realization that, for best
performance, packets need to be “in and out” of a NetfilterQueue queue in under
500 milliseconds. To achieve this peak performance, the team decided to create one
queue per device to be secured, but maintain a single target Python workflow so as
to maintain scalability.
For each intercepted and queued packet, the Python workflow extracted a) packet
size, b) TCP source port, c) TCP destination port, d) an integer hash of TCP flags,
e) UDP source port, and f) UDP destination port. The workflow would extract
source MAC address, as well, so as to determine the appropriate random forest
models to reference. All random forest models across all device functionalities were
loaded into memory at the start of live-filtering to improve live-time responsiveness.
After identifying the appropriate models for a device, the Python workflow used the
packet feature vector as extracted from each packet to make a prediction against
each functionality model so as to associate or disassociate a queued packet with
a functionality. In testing, the team determined that a single prediction could be
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Figure 3.10: Blink camera live stream fails when degraded in real time.
made in approximately 40 milliseconds, meaning that around twelve functionalities
could be added for each device while maintaining peak performance. If a packet
was predicted to be associated with a particular functionality, and if the particular
functionality was to be degraded as specified by an end-user, that packet would
be dropped. Similarly, if a packet could not be positively classified as a particular
device functionality by any of random forest models on record, that packet was
assumed to be anomalous and was dropped.
3.15 Constructing and Integrating the Graphic
User Interface
This integration platform would take the form of a user-friendly Graphic User In-
terface for a nontechnical home user to interact with.
Since we were hosting the GUI on the Raspberry Pi, which was situated behind a
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router, we needed to set up port forwarding such that all HTTP traffic to a specified
port of the router, would connect into the Pi. We mapped Port 8081 on the Pi to
port 2023 on the router. On the Pi, the GUI was hosted at 192.168.0.149, the Pi’s
private IP address, on port 8081. Once running on the Pi, the GUI can be opened
from any web browser by entering the routers IP 68.116.160.168, a colon, followed
by the forwarding port, 2023, for example http://68.116.160.168:2203/.
In selecting a development platform for a front end, we had the following re-
quirements:
1. We need the ability to run headless, since the suite will be ran from the Pi
without a connected display
2. We need abundant documentation to support the rapid development needed
for the scope of this project
3. We need a lightweight solution with few dependencies, as the resources avail-
able on the Pi are limited
4. We need the ability to run commands and to dynamically load and change
data to display
We considered Django, Pyramid, PyQT, and PySimpleGUI as possible solutions.
We selected PySimpleGUIWeb [40] as it met all of our criteria. First, web hosting
functionality available and streamlined through Remi python package. Second, full
“cookbook” of documentation for various programs as well as tutorials. Third,
Remi is the only other package installed with PySimpleGUI. Fourth, while elements
cannot be created or deleted during runtime, they can be hidden or shown, and
can use subprocess through python to execute commands as normal to a shell.
PySimpleGUI is a python wrapper for tkinter, Qt, wxPython and Remi as a means
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for rapid development through less lines of code. It is deployable on almost all OS’s
as well as deployable on hardware form Android devices, Raspberry Pi Monitors,
computers, and web browsers.
3.16 Viewing the Results of Fingerprinting
The management system displays the fingerprint data to the GUI by analyzing the
output folder from our Fingerprint module. If a new folder is discovered it is added to
the data structure and the device’s MAC address is displayed under found devices.
Then, the detailed information and fingerprint result json is parsed.The several
nested dictionaries within each synthesized json had to be flattened. Extraneous
information such as boolean values, numbers, or empty lists, were also removed.
The final display output is the most relevant non-empty fields that were obtained
from fingerprinting, and useful to a home user in matching the description to a
device they own.
3.17 Loading Saved Trained Functions
When the “Load Functions” button is pressed, any saved device function models will
be identified and loaded into the GUI as a list. This will search through each device
folder that has been generated from fingerprinting. If a sub-directory is discovered
that is not “baseline” training data, then the name of that function, the device
MAC address and default rule of “allow” is added as a single line in a text file
named degradeRules.txt.
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3.18 Anomaly Detection Integration and Notifi-
cations
Upon start-up of the GDI Suite, a threaded call to the runIDS() function from
gui_kitsune.py begins training for anomaly detection. Arguments can be passed
for anomaly trigger threshold, the number of packets to collect for training, the .pcap
time interval, and max auto encoder size. Currently we pass (10, 30000, 10, 15).
Once trained, if an anomaly occurs, the source and destination MAC addresses will
be appended to a log file. The GUI must actively look for modifications to this
file without blocking other processes. Through the python library watchdog [6],
we create a pattern matching observer that monitors the log file for modifications.
When modification is detected we pull the last added line of the log file for the
source and destination MAC addresses of the anomaly. We notify the user, activate
the degradation filter and display the friendly names of the anomalous devices if
available.
3.19 Viewing and Changing a Function’s Degra-
dation Status
Upon selecting a function from the displayed list, a look-up function is called to
check the current rule by MAC address and function name pair. If educational
flags are found, the relevant educational information is displayed. Depending on the
current rule in the text file for degrade or allow, the opposing choices button will be
enabled and highlighted. For example, if a rule is currently allowed, Only the option
to block the function will be highlighted. Upon clicking block in this example, the
look-up function is called again, to update the value within degradeRules.txt from
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allow to block. The allow button will now be highlighted to provide the option to
accept this function once again.
3.20 Training a New Function through the User
Interface
Once a user populates the device and function information. When ready the user
can click the “Train Function”, button. This will pass MAC address, and function
name to a blocking subprocess in the form of
$ sudo python3 /home/pi/MQP/degradation/create_training_set,py --mac
MAC --feature functionName
.
When successfully trained, the MAC, function name, allow, and educational flags
stored as numbers are added to “degradeRules.txt”. Then another blocking process
calls update_models.py, which will update the random forest classifier models of
all functions.
3.21 Activating the Degradation Filter
The degredation filter is triggered by anomalies and can also be manually trig-
gered through clicking the “Activate Degrade Filter” button. This allows a user
to have the option to always enact their preferred level of privacy. When the
degradation filtering rules are activated, we parse the MAC,function,rule lines from
degradeRules.txt into pairs of a device MAC, followed by all of its functions and
corresponding rules. Example of such pairs can be seen as
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“MAC1,function1,rule1,function2,rule2 MAC2,function1,rule1”. These pairs are passed
as arguments to a subprocess of secure_filter.py. From there secure_filter.py
builds the IP table rules to degrade the functions accordingly.
3.22 Disabling the Degradation Filter
When the user either wishes to update their device functionality preferences, or
deactivate the filter, they press the red button which states it will remove the filter.
This calls
$ pkill -TERM -P pid
where pid is the process ID (PID) of the sudo command which activated the filter.
This will kill the process and all child processes of the PID which spawn from issuing
with sudo privileges. Next a subprocess is issued to ensure the IP Table rules are
flushed via
$ sudo iptables -t raw -F
. All degradation is stopped, and can be started again if the filter is triggered by





Here, we discuss the fortes and limitations of the approach aforementioned. We
speak to fingerprinting, intrusion detection, graceful degradation, and integration
capabilities as developed.
4.1 Fingerprinting
To validate the fingerprinting approach aforementioned, the team conducted re-
search to determine actual manufacturers, operating systems, and device types of
the testbed IoT devices. Then, the team referenced fingerprinting data obtained
from Nmap [30], Fingerbank [18], and p0f [53] and cross-checked these results with
open source information known to be correct [29] [48] [9] [16] [41]
[24]. A summary of fingerprinting accuracies can be observed in the table below.
Overall, the team’s fingerprinting approach correctly determined device manufac-
turer in 89% of cases, operating system in 67% of cases, and device type in 67%
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Figure 4.1: Correctness of manufacturer, operating system, and device type guesses
made by fingerprinting capabilities (correct guesses highlighted in green).
of cases. However, the probability that at least two of the three categories were
determined correctly for a device was 89%. Below, correct guesses are highlighted
in green. Full fingerprinting results can be found in the Appendix.
The team’s layered approach to device fingerprinting yields generally reliable
data. The results above suggest that device manufacturers can be determined ac-
curately, but that device operating systems and broadened device types are more
difficult to ascertain. In some cases, fingerprinting capabilities would yield the man-
ufacturer of a device’s network card. Though accurate, these guesses could confuse
an end user attempting to identify devices on his or her network. The team ac-
knowledges that previous works such as AuDI [32], ProfilIoT [38], and IFRAT [25]
provide comprehensive suites that more accurately fingerprint devices. However,
for the purposes of this project, which focuses primarily on intrusion detection and
graceful degradation, the team found its fingerprinting capabilities to be satisfac-
tory. In future work, the team would integrate a more comprehensive fingerprinting
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solution so as to provide increased ease of use for an end user.
Although our fingerprinting approach accurately determined two of three finger-
printing indicators (manufacturer, operating system, broader type) for 89% percent
of tested devices, we consider possible limitations of the capability. First, Nmap [30]
is “active”, meaning that it interacts directly with a targeted device via network
communication. Fingerprinting traffic between a router and a targeted device can,
in some cases, be flagged as anomalous by an intrusion detection system. Although
we did not encounter this scenario in testing, we recognize that this problem could
arise in future work. Second, the team uses well-known and well-documented finger-
printing tools that could harbor known vulnerabilities. A well-read attacker could
tailor tool-specific traffic spoofers so as to misdirect Nmap [30], Fingerbank [18], or
p0f [53] with the ultimate goal of undermining fingerprinting confidence.
4.2 Anomaly Detection
After exploring a multitude of attack vectors and collecting and labeling network
captures, we synthesized the data into a ROC curve. This visualization allowed
us to determine an appropriate threshold based on the trade off of detecting an
attack versus triggering a false positive. By utilizing this tool, we are able to select
a threshold that limits false positives and maximizes meaningful alerts. Minimizing
false positives is necessary to build trust between the system and the user, as the
user does not want to be bombarded by false alerts. If the false positive rate is too
low, however, then the IDS begins to loose detection sensitivity. For example, by
selecting the threshold that has less than a 10% false positive rate we achieve an
attack sensitivity rate of nearly 50%.
While Kitsune excelled at providing an efficient and effective IDS, it is not infal-
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Figure 4.2: ROC Plot for Kitsune IDS.
lible. Unsupervised learning, for example, is susceptible to poisoning attacks. This
can occur when malicious behavior is present in network traffic during the training
or learning phases of the feature extractor and anomaly detector. The consequences
of a successful poisoning attack would mean that the IDS would not detect malicious
traffic as it was trained to consider that traffic as normal.
Additionally, when carrying out a MITM on our testbed network, the intro-
duction of a foreign device to the network triggered an anomaly. The behavior is
beneficial in the case that the foreign device is actually an attacker with malicious
intent. In this situation, the user would like to be notified when such an event oc-
curs. However, if the foreign device is benevolent device, such as a new device the
user is adding to thier home, they would not like to trigger an anomaly. Kitsune
would have to be retrained to include benign traffic from this additional device.
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Figure 4.3: Average classifier confidences for trained functionalities across devices.
4.3 Degradation
To validate the degradation approach aforementioned, the team determined an aver-
age classifier confidence and attempted to positively identify device functionalities in
real time. First, the team’s approach formulated a random forest classifier for each
device functionality. Each random forest classifier provided a confidence level, that
is, a self-determined, but theoretical, measure of accuracy. Across trained device
functionalities, an average classification confidence level of 0.9440 was achieved.
Second, the team used ten live tests to record a confusion matrix for each device
functionality as trained. For the purposes of experimentation, the team started
degradation capabilities in a passive context so that device functionalities would be
recognized but not degraded. In five of the ten tests, the team demonstrated a target
functionality and then recorded the functionality recognized by the degradation
capabilities. For example, if the team was testing for recognition accuracy of smart
camera live streaming, the team would initiate live streaming from a mobile app and
then record the functionality as recognized by the degradation suite. Similarly, in the
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Figure 4.4: Average classifier accuracies for trained functionalities across testbed
devices, determined with real-time experimentation.
other five tests, the team would demonstrate other, trained device functionalities,
but not the target functionality. For example, if the team was testing for recognition
accuracy of smart camera live streaming, the team would initiate another feature,
such as motion detection arming, and then record the functionality as recognized by
the suite. Results per functionalities were represented as follows in the matrices as
presented herein: a) true positive: a functionality was demonstrated and classified,
b) false positive: a functionality was not demonstrated but was classified, c) true
negative: a functionality was not demonstrated nor classified, and d) false negative:
a functionality was demonstrated but not classified. Across all confusion matrices,
the team achieved an average accuracy, or ACC, of 0.9260.
The team’s degradation results demonstrate that three minute, user-supervised,
functionality training phases can be leveraged to accurately identify packets as-
sociated with particular IoT device functionalities in real time. By maintaining
functionality-labeled packets as retrieved from previous training phases, the team
creates accurate classifiers infused with noise from extraneous device functionalities
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and requires a very brief training phase for new functionalities. The results demon-
strate that noise improves classifier confidence. The team expects this approach
would scale across all IoT devices that utilize Wi-Fi or Ethernet communication as
random forest classifiers are created individually for each and every device function-
ality. Further, this approach shows that even functionalities with encrypted traffic
can be classified with high confidence.
Many advanced traffic classification schemes, such as Peek-a-boo [3] and Kit-
sune [34], leverage machine learning approaches to draw meaningful associations
and dissociations between feature vectors as derived from packets of various device
functionalities. Random forest, as used in this project, was evaluated by the au-
thors of Peek-a-boo [3] and reported to have an accuracy of 91% when mapping
network traffic to device functions; expectedly, our team achieved a comparable
accuracy of 94% using random forest classifiers. This is understandable because
our team’s leverage of machine learning to degrade functionalities was very similar
to Peek-a-boo’s [3] leverage of machine learning to ascertain device activity from
an adversarial standpoint. Of note, Peek-a-boo [3] also evaluated the k-nearest
neighbors algorithm, which was reported to have an accuracy of 89%. Future work
could explore various machine learning algorithms in the context of degradation as
supported by machine learning.
Although our approach yielded high confidences and accuracies, we consider
possible limitations of the system. First, this particular approach could face lower
accuracies while attempting to classify traffic associated with automated firmware
updates. Automated updates perform at random time intervals and are inherently
difficult to classify without existing knowledge of their behavioral characteristics,
which oftentimes vary across iterations. Therefore, automated updates would likely
be labeled as anomalous in a contingency scenario where a compromised device was
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Figure 4.5: A full look at the completed GDI Security Suite.
attempting to update automatically. However, if a user were to train an “update
functionality” manually, this problem would likely not arise as traffic associated with
the update could be modeled and identified as a functionality. Second, while brief,
the degradation stages of this approach still require user supervision. Assuming that
a home user will cooperate in training is critical to the success of this system, and
while training periods are short, if a user does not train functions, there is no way
to detect or degrade them.
4.4 User Interface
We successfully unified all three platforms into one straightforward, appealing user
interface we named the GDI Security Suite, see Figure 4.5. Our user interface
implements the HCI practices of repetition, alignment, contrast, and spacing to
create a familiar and easier to navigate interface for users.
From the GDI Suite, a user can fingerprint devices, view device information,
apply friendly names to the MAC addresses of devices, load trained device functions,
62
Figure 4.6: On top is all running python processes, followed by the normal UI display
shown in green and the empty iptable rules.
Figure 4.7: With the degrade filter on, the iptable rules are bound and notification
displayed.
train new device functions, toggle a device function between allowed or blocked, and
activate the security filter.
In Figure 4.6 we see the background information related to the GDI Suite running
in an uninfected state. In Figure 4.7, we see the updates to both the UI and the
back-end when an anomaly is detected, and the degrade filter is enabled.
The GDI Suite can provide the following optional educational text:
• This function operates basic device states like on or off. Hackers can turn these
devices on and off at their choosing. Also functions that control the powering
on or off of devices such as lights, or thermostats, may allow hackers to infer
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when you are home or awake, versus away or asleep.
• This function records audio. Hackers can view camera feeds, take pictures,
and activate or deactivate cameras. Again they can see if you are home or
awake, versus away or asleep.
• This function records video. Hackers can listen to and record audio files from
your device. They may also be able to broadcast their own audio announce-
ments over the speakers whenever they choose.
Our UI faced latency issues which stem from two main issues. The first is
that PySimpleGUI is designed for rapid development of simple form-like UIs. It is
meant for the simple getting of text and values, not for a complex dynamic web
application. The size and complexity of the UI causes occasional glitches where not
all of the information is fully displayed and requires another click, which should be
eliminated for a final product. The second, and largest attributor to lag in the UI
is the hardware restrictions of the Raspberry Pi. We are using a Raspberry Pi 3
with 1 GB of RAM and limited processing power, running Raspian Buster operating
system. From this device we host a web server, train machine learning algorithms,
host an intrusion detection system, and run several subprocesses. The random forest
models are loaded directly into RAM to ensure quick matching, yet consume almost
the entirety of the available 1 GB in some cases. The learning of new functions
and intrusion detection is carried out by the CPU. The RAM and CPU are central
limiting factors to this projects current scalability and performance speed.
Another limitation of the UI is the lack of user testing for the educational value
of our system. While our system implements HCI design principles and provides





In this chapter, we summarize limitations of our current work and highlight areas
for future improvement. To summarize, we believe our current limitations include:
• Latency from hardware restrictions
• Fingerprinting inaccuracies and/or lack of specificity
• Degradation requires user interaction
• Susceptibility to adversarial machine learning attacks
• Creating a more sensitive IDS while still minimizing the false positive rate
In order to fully automate the system, a team could develop a traffic classification
approach that could identify clusters as indicative of particular functionalities with-
out supervision. The fingerprinting and anomaly degradation stages as discussed
previously are completely unsupervised; an unsupervised degradation stage would
make the team’s approach completely autonomous.
While already automated, anomaly detection could be made more robust by cre-
ating a device functionality-based anomaly detection system. Currently, our model
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intercepts network-based attacks. However, being able to view types and combi-
nations of device functionalities as well as their frequncies, offers a more holistic
anomaly detection system. For example, if a Hue light bulb starts turning off and
on rapidly in the middle of the night, an attacker could be causing such issue that
should trigger an anomaly. Function-based anomaly detection would require a much
more in depth training phase as a users “normal” device usage must be learned over
several days or even weeks. During this training phase, the device may be suscep-
tible to start up attacks, since the large period of time allows for attackers poison
the benign training data with unnatural device functionalities.
We would also like to continue testing our implementation of Kitsune to both
validate our data processing technique and test the IDS against a wider array of
attack vectors. The more thoroughly we test the IDS the better we can adapt it to
the dynamic threat landscape that it will undoubtedly see. Additional implemen-
tation would also include a retrain functionality that will activate after events such
as firmware updates and the introduction of a new, benign device.
Further integration between anomaly detection and the UI could include a slider
to tune the sensitivity of the IDS. Based on our generated ROC curve, different
thresholds can be used to achieve a less sensitive IDS with smaller probabilities of
raising false positives and vice versa. Incorporating a slider to allow a user to tune
the IDS enables to user to customize the security suite to their desired acceptable
risk tolerance.
A future user testing experiment would provide feedback on the interface design,
labeling queries, and risk education of our system. Updates could then be added
to restructure the information in a more logical order to users, or streamline areas
users found confusing.
As mentioned, our current system could be expanded to save the function-traffic
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feature mappings to a database, and used in the future by the scientific community.
The findings from a 2018 survey of machine learning practices and techniques for ML
in network applications, highlights a need for such live device traffic: “Therefore,
a combined effort from both academia and industry is needed, to create public
repositories of data traces annotated with ground truth from various real networks”
[10]. We already classify and store rules for each functionality with a friendly name.
With the consent of a home user, a friendly name and training sample pair can be
saved to a public database and used to boost performance of classifying the same
feature, as well as used by researchers for similar work.
If future devices depend heavily on Bluetooth or alternative protocols, we believe
our random forest classification, and training method would allow for alternate
protocol functions to be degraded similar to Wi-Fi. This would require the proper
hardware to sniff these protocols. New features would have to be identified unique to
the transmission packets of those protocols. Those features would then be extracted
and computed with the random forest classifier. Alternate protocols do not have IP





In conclusion, the team engineered a complete, integrated IoT security suite that
accurately and confidently fingerprinted WiFi devices, detected network-based in-
trusions, and gracefully degraded individual device functionalities. First, across
89% of tested devices, the team accurately fingerprinted manufacturer and oper-
ating system, manufacturer and type, or operating system and type. Second, our
near real-time IDS detects network attacks and intrusions with greater than 90%
accuracy by leveraging a lightweight ensemble of autoencoders. Third, the team
unified all of these successful tools into one cohesive, user-friendly, graphical user
interface. The interface allowed non-technical end users to identify and train device
functionalities while learning about the risks associated with different categorical
classifications of device functionalities. Lastly, across all device functionalities as
trained, the team achieved a) an average traffic classifier confidence of 94% and
b) an average traffic classifier accuracy of 93%. The performance of our degrada-
tion capabilities were greatly enhanced by training the functionality classifiers with
network traffic already recorded from previous training phases.
If widely adopted, the approach presented would offer an elevated level of net-
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work security and user privacy for WiFi networks harboring IoT devices. We present
a highly scalable, accurate, and confident framework that remains comprehensible
and customizable to the average end user. GDI security differs from current solu-
tions in presenting a graceful degradation strategy that allows compromised devices
to maintain a minimum level of functionality in lieu of complete isolation or quaran-
tine. The IoT device industry only continues to grow, introducing new security and
privacy vulnerabilities. GDI security provides and adaptable, comprehensive home




In this section, we present confusion matrices and console logs as obtained through
degradation testing and additional screenshots of the user interface.
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Figure 7.1: Classifier confidences for Blink camera.
Figure 7.2: Confusion matrix for Blink baseline behavior experimental testing.
Figure 7.3: Confusion matrix for Blink motion detection experimental testing.
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Figure 7.4: Confusion matrix for Blink live photo experimental testing.
Figure 7.5: Confusion matrix for Blink live video experimental testing.
Figure 7.6: Classifier confidences for Echo Dot.
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Figure 7.7: Confusion matrix for Echo Dot baseline behavior experimental testing.
Figure 7.8: Confusion matrix for Echo Dot audio announcement experimental test-
ing.
Figure 7.9: Confusion matrix for Echo Dot live, audio drop-in experimental testing.
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Figure 7.10: Classifier confidences for Etekcity smart plug.
Figure 7.11: Confusion matrix for Etekcity smart plug baseline behavior experimen-
tal testing.
Figure 7.12: Confusion matrix for Etekcity smart plug on and off behavior experi-
mental testing.
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Figure 7.13: Classifier confidences for Raspberry Pi 3.
Figure 7.14: Confusion matrix for Raspberry Pi 3 SSH connection initiation behavior
experimental testing.
Figure 7.15: Classifier confidences for TP-Link smart plug.
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Figure 7.16: Confusion matrix for TP-Link smart plug baseline behavior experimen-
tal testing.
Figure 7.17: Confusion matrix for TP-Link smart plug on and off behavior experi-
mental testing.
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Figure 7.18: Classifying Alexa drop-in behavior
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Figure 7.19: Classifying Alexa baseline behavior
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Figure 7.20: Classifying TP-Link plug on/off behavior
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Figure 7.21: Classifying Blink camera arm/disarm behavior
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Figure 7.22: Classifying Blink camera live picture behavior
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Figure 7.23: Classifying Blink camera live video stream behavior
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Figure 7.24: Renaming a device in the UI
Figure 7.25: Choosing to degrade a function through the UI
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